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RESDISCOVERING THE LAW’S MORAL ROOTS 
Morris B. Hoffman* 
In their recent essay,1 Professors Berman and Bibas stake out terribly 
important ground, recognizing and then wonderfully articulating an essen-
tial duality between justice and emotion, and between law and morality, all 
in the context of the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape as 
raised in Kennedy v. Louisiana.2 
I do not express any opinion on whether their insight should have dri-
ven a different result in Kennedy—after all, there was the constitutional 
question of whether due process, or the Eighth Amendment, means that on-
ly death justifies death.  True, labeling that inquiry as constitutional does 
not rescue us or the members of the Court from the ―normative Furies,‖ to 
paraphrase Professors Berman and Bibas.  Indeed, they are right to point 
out that those Furies are precisely what drove some state legislatures to 
make death the penalty for raping children, that such a journey is deeply 
personal and one about which reasonable and honorable legislators may 
disagree, and that this is therefore a fray into which the judicial branch 
should be especially leery to enter. 
Still, the ultimate decision in Kennedy required the Court’s full range 
of constitutional tools, including, but certainly not limited to, its ability to 
recognize a state’s legitimate, emotional, and democratic expressions of 
deeply held stigma.  Those of us who care about constitutional processes—
not just outcomes—believe that some other tools, including text, history, 
and stare decisis should also play into the mix.3 
In fact, when I read the increasingly voluminous literature on law and 
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public’s mind.  When law professors start writing about ―emotion,‖ this 
may give the general public exactly the wrong idea—that law is arbitrary, 
that decisions are whatever a single judge or jury ―feels‖ is right, and that 
the best lawyers win because a trial is not really about the search for truth 
but is instead some kind of legal version of American Idol.  Indeed, it is a 
depressing fact, at least in my experience, that many prospective jurors al-
ready believe in this kind of relativist entertainment-based narrative; though 
the good news is that even those susceptible to this belief almost always 
take their oaths seriously, manage to transcend their beliefs, and return 
sensible verdicts based on the evidence.  In any event, it may be, to paraph-
rase the old joke, that emotion, like sex and math, is something we are al-
ways thinking about but should seldom do in public. 
Still, the payoff seems well worth the risk, especially since the post-
modernists, on both the left and right, have spent so long trying to remove 
morals from every aspect of intellectual life.  When I ask my law and biolo-
gy students to give me a list of universal human do’s and don’ts, they look 
at me like I was speaking Samoan.5  They have been taught for years that 
there is no right or wrong, that culture is everything, and that (on the left) 
law is just the tool of retaining power or (on the right) that it is just a way to 
make markets more efficient.  As a result, most students are completely un-
prepared for anything even approaching a rich discussion of law and mo-
rality.  Against this backdrop, risking a little overkill seems well worth it. 
The law and emotion literature is just a small part of a broader redisco-
very of the law’s moral roots,6 a rediscovery that has significance far 
beyond the death penalty.  It is driving a profound neo-retributivist rethink-
ing of the purposes of punishment.  Criminal law, and many if not most as-
pects of all law, are coming to be understood as cultural expressions of 
deeply held, and largely shared, moral intuitions.  Those moral intuitions 
are, in turn, often instantiated by neural systems that have important emo-
tional aspects.  To simplify: it helps us all avoid becoming child rapists by 
being viscerally repulsed by child rape.  Emotion is not the enemy of the 
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mind’s rationality, it is its lubricant, a kind of evolutionary shortcut when 
circumstances don’t warrant reflection (fight or flight) or when reflection 
could lead us astray or leave us paralyzed. 
Notice that Berman and Bibas don’t just say law is ―linked‖ with emo-
tion.  Everyone says that, and then proceeds to criticize a verdict, opinion, 
statute, or proposed reform, arguing that somehow emotion, rather than ra-
tionality, drove the particular decision.  This is all part of the larger Hobbe-
sian fiction that law, and civilization for that matter, wages a constant battle 
against instinct, and instinct’s cousin, emotion.  But it is becoming increa-
singly clear that humans, precisely because we are such profoundly social 
creatures, have an evolved instinct to make and adhere to rules every bit as 
much as we have an instinct to break them.  We have evolved a complex 
accommodation between self and others that includes a deeply held, univer-
sal, and largely culture-independent core of right and wrong.7 
Berman and Bibas recognize this core, if not its evolutionary roots.  
And nowhere is that core more evident than in criminal law, and in the 
courtrooms where criminal law is applied.  Anyone who has ever attended a 
sentencing hearing of any kind recognizes immediately that it is one act in a 
morality play.  Emotions flood the courtroom, both catalyzing and inhibit-
ing the results.  Criminal law is applied human nature, and its application 
needs to be richly attuned both to the universality of that nature and to its 
dizzying variations. 
I have a few small quibbles with the essay.  I doubt, for example, that 
talking about ―emotional capacity‖ will shed any light on the difficult issues 
of culpability, excuse, and justification.8  On the contrary, we can fairly as-
sume every child rapist has several defects, ―emotional incapacity‖ being 
only one.  But surely that is not an excusing condition.  In this regard, Ber-
man and Bibas seem to commit the same baseline error as Justice Kennedy 
did in Roper v. Simmons:9 Of course juvenile brains are not generally as de-
veloped as adult brains.  Of course child rapists have some empathy issues.  
Yet most people with underdeveloped brains or empathy issues still manage 
to get through their lives without committing murder or child rape.  Even if 
there were some causative link between these alleged disabilities and the 
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excuse.10  I would also have preferred an emphasis on broader targets than 
the death penalty, but of course I understand that the death penalty is the 
Golden Road to emotion, and therefore represents an exaggerated context in 
which to raise these important issues. 
But these are nit-picking criticisms.  The Berman and Bibas essay hits 
the nail on the head: law and emotion are two sides of the same coin be-
cause the coin is us, and our evolved neuroarchitectures.  Pretending that 
the criminal law is not a reflection of our deepest moral instincts misses the 
essential nature of both.  Their essay should be required reading for every 
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